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METAPHYSICS. 



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AN OUTLINE /tom*#*f « 



OF 



METAPHYSICAL ENQUIRY, 



WITH 



SPECIAL REFERENCE 



TO THE 



PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND. 



PRINTED FOR THE 

BENARES SCHOOL BOOK SOCIETY. 



Mivwvovei 

ORPHAN SCHOOL PRESS, 
1848. 



* 



ft* 






PREFACE 



A bare and clear outline, or sketch-map, of the 
province of Metaphysical research, appears to be a 
desideratum. 






In the voluminous writings of Locke, Berkeley 
Reid, Stewart, Brown, Whewell, Mill, &c 
mighty maze, though not without a plan," the ma- 
jority of schoolboys get quite bewildered. Even Dr. 
Abercrombie's popular work is too diffuse to serve 
as a convenient first text-book. In the few pages 
following, an attempt has been made to give the rea- 
der an available definition of the principal terms 
employed in the enquiry, and a methodical frame- 
work, into the clearly apprehended 'compartments 
of which each observation of value connected with 
the subject that he may meet with in his future 
reading, will naturally fall, and settle in its proper 
place. Towards the effecting of such a purpose, 
brevity is indispensable, and no other apology need 
be offered for adopting a style simply dogmatic, and 
for giving a single definition, and, as far as possible, 
the central and etymological one, of w r ords which the 
vagueness of current use would enable one to define 
under half-a-dozen different shades of signification, 

Benares College, Sept. 8, 1848. J. R. B«>ttw£i*«- 



SYNOPSIS. 



What exists 
may be 
named 
either. . . < 



Substance 



( 



Spirit 



God. 

Soul or Mind< 



Matter. 



State of 
Conscious- 
ness . . . . <{ 



Inseparable 

condition f Time. 
of Thought^ 

I Space, 



Sensation. C associated in train? 

Thought. J ofideas - 

Emotion. L considered apart 
from such associa* 
tion. 
Volition — leading to Action. 



^Attribute , 



("Relative 

■ \ 



f Founded on a sim* 
pie fact. 



i 



I i 



Non-relative, (^Founded on a com- 
plication of facts 6 
or Quality. 



METAPHYSICS. 



] . — Whatever can be conceived., can 
Existence, have a name assigned to it ; and what- 
ever is nameable, either exists, or it 
does not. A. philosopher may have doubted the 
existence of an external worlds and of other think- 
ing beings besides himself, but no one can well 
doubt his own existence ; for the fact of his doubt- 
ing, or thinking, is to him the proper, and indeed 
the only possible evidence that he himself exists, 
even were every other apparently existing thing a 
delusion. 

2. — Every name denotes either 
Nameable things, a Substance, or a State of Con- 
sciousness, or an Inseparable 
condition of Thought, or an Attribute. Substance 
is either Matter, or Spirit; which latter denotes 
God the Creator, and Mind, the seat of Conscious- 
ness. A state of Consciousness is either a Sensa- 
tion, a Thought, an Emotion, or a Volition. The 
inseparable conditions of thought are Space and 
Time. An Attribute is either Relative or Non-rela 
tive. Non-relative attributes are termed Qua- 
lities. Relative attributes are either simple or com- 

A 



6 ELEMENTS OF 

plex. Simple Relative Attributes are those of Po- 
sition, Simultaneity, Succession, Similarity, Iden- 
tity, Difference, Power, Number, Quantity, &c. 
Complex relative attributes, such as Paternity, 
Property, and the like, are innumerable. 

3. — The unknown proximate cause 
Matter. of our sensations is called Matter. In 
regard to Matter we know nothing ex- 
cept its phenomena ; that is to say, the ways in 
which it affects our senses. When we speak of a 
portion of Matter, of a Stone for example, we can 
tell nothing about its nature, except that it is 
something which appears to us to be of a cer- 
tain size, figure, weight, &c. &c; in other words, 
it is something in which we may say that the qua- 
lities of size, figure, weight, &c. reside ; but what 
that something is, in which these qualities re- 
side, we cannot tell. We can give it a name, and 
we give it the name of Matter, but the name re- 
cords no addition to our knowledge ; it merely 
serves to refer the hearer to " something, we cannot 
tell what." It is like the letter conventionally 
used in Algebra as the symbol of an unknown quan- 
tity. The use of such symbols enables lis to arrive 
at the knowledge of a great many valuable truths, 
and the risk of its leading us into error, arises only 
when we forget that the symbol, standing for some- 
thing that we do not know, is the evidence not of 
our knowledge, but of our ignorance. 



METAPHYSICS. 7 

4. — In like manner, when we speak of 
Mind, the Mind, we can tell nothing about its 
nature, except that it is something which 
possesses certain qualities, or which exists in various 
states of consciousness, which appear to follow 
certain laws. The characteristic of mind is con- 
sciousness, — this being the generic name for all the 
classes of feeling. As the Mind is the essential 
part of man*s nature, it constitutes, what is term- 
ed his Soul, — that in virtue of which a man is 
himself. That, in virtue of which a man is him- 
self, is not his body. We do not say of Devadatta's 
dead body that it is himself. We speak of it as 
something which he himself has quitted — which 
his soul has quitted. We proceed to consider in 
their order, the states of consciousness. 

5. — Sensation is a state of the mind, 
Sensation, brought about through the medium 
of the senses of Sight, Hearing, Smell, 
Taste and Touch. 

6. — The organ of sight is the Eye. By 
Sight, the eye we judge of the distance of an 
object from us, and of its size ; but this 
is an acquired power, and is the result of inference. 
Things .near, appear distinct, and things distant, 
appear indistinct. A very large tree may be seen 
as if depicted on the glass of a very small window 
through which we view it ; yet the tree does not 
give us the impression of its being small, because 



8 ELEMENTS OF 

its indistinctness reminds us that it is distant. The 
sun is ninety millions of miles distant, but the 
sun is not indistinct ; and therefore, though it is 
immensely larger than the earthy it appears to the 
eye to be at no great distance, and smaller than a 
potter's wheel. 

7. — The organ of hearing is the Ear* 
Hearing. Knowledge received through the ear, 
like that received through the eye, is 
much modified by inference. A sound, to one near 
the cause of the sound, is louder than to one more 
distant from it ; hence, when we do not know the 
distance bf the cause of the sound, we may con- 
found the thunder of a distant cloud, with the 
rumbling of a neighbouring cart. 

8. — The sense of smell has its 
Smell and Taste, organ in the Nose, which is 
conveniently situated over the 
Mouth, in which resides the sense of Taste, as if 
designed to watch that nothing unsavoury — and 
what is really offensive to the nose is seldom savoury 
— shall pass into the mouth in the way of food. 

Taste and smell are the only two amcng the 
senses that have the slightest resemblance to each 
other. The quality of matter, of which the one 
takes cognizance when the matter is suspended in 
a liquid, is not utterly unlike that which the other 
recognises when the matter is suspended in air. 



METAPHYSICS. 9 

9. — The sense of Touch is distributed 
Touch, in greater or lesser measure over the 
greater portion of the body. It is parti- 
cularly delicate at the tips of the fingers. 

10. — Our sensations are re- 
Object and Event, ceived either simultaneously or 
successively. When several are 
received simultaneously, as the smell, the taste, 
the colour, the form, &c, of a fruit, their as- 
sociation makes up the notion of an Object; and 
the separate cause of each of the associated sen- 
sations which we attribute to it, is called a qua- 
lity of the object. When sensations are received 
successively, their association makes up the notion 
of an Event ; — as when the sight of the lightning 
is followed by the sound of the thunder. 

11. — When we think of a body, or 
Space, portion of matter, we are, from the 
very conditions of such a conception, 
obliged to admit that it occupies a space as large 
as itself. Where there is this amount of space, we 
cannot help feeling that there must be more adjoin- 
ing it on all sides ; and however much more we may 
think of, we cannot conceive it as having an end. 
12. — To what we regard as having 
Infinity, no end, we give the name of Infinite. 
13. — In the case of an event, the 
Time. existence of an impression along with 
the memory of a previous impression, 



10 ELEMENTS OF 

compels us to view these associated impressions as 

belonging to successive portions of what 

Eternity, we call Time. Time, like space, we 

cannot help regarding as infinite. — The 

infinity of time is expressed by the term Eternity. 

14. — A sensation continues only so 
Memory, long as its cause is not removed. After 
the sensation has ceased, however, all 
knowledge of it does not vanish. That the mind 
retains a knowledge of a state of conciousness after 
it has ceased, is expressed by saying, that it has 
the faculty of Memory. What remains 
Ideas. after the departure of a sensation, being 
regarded as a picture or copy of the sen- 
sation, is generally called an Idea, from a Greek 
word signifying an image, or representation. 

We are not to imagine that there are any actual 
pictures thus impressed on some portion of the 
Mind, and that this portion of the Mind is called 
the Memory. The word Idea is to be understood 
merely as denoting the unknown cause of our re- 
membering sensations, and other states of consci- 
ousness. 

Some philosophers, wondering how Mind could 
take cognizance of Matter, have supposed that the 
Mind does so only by means of a representation, 
such as we have warned the reader against fancying 
an Idea to be. They then quite consistently argu- 



METAPHYSICS. 



11 



ed that we can b& certain of the existence of the 
representation alone, and that our belief in the exis- 
tence of the material world is an error. This ar- 
gument is to be met by denying the necessity for 
the supposed representation. How Mind takes 
cognizance of Matter, is known to God only* 

Those ideas are the most likely to remain in the 
Memory, the original impression of which was the 
most vivid. When, out of several simultaneous im- 
pressions, some one occupies the Mind 
Attention, more vividly, we are saicLto attend to it. 
The Mind possesses a certain control 
over the vividness of its impressions, and this, which 
is called the faculty of Attention, being the basis of 
all intellectual progress, is of primary importance 
in the education of the Mind. 

15. — Each of the Ideas 
Association of Ideas, which we may speak of the 
memory as being stored with, 
does not act at all times upon the' Mind as a 
cause of consciousness ; but our -ideas are so asso- 
ciated one with another, that the presence of one re- 
calls another, and that other a third ; and this 
process is constantly going on in the mind, and pro- 
ducing, what is called, the 
The Train of Thought. Train of Thought. For ex- 
ample, I see a pandit. I 
immediately think of the Sanskrit language. The 
idea of the Sanskrit probably suggests that of the 



12 ELEMENTS OF 

Greek, which so strikingly resembles it. The idea 
of the Greek language calls up the idea of the 
country of Greece, or perhaps of Oxford, where 
it is so diligently studied. And so the train of 
thought goes on, until some fresh sensation occurs 
to turn it into perhaps some entirely 
Reflection, different channel. When thought con- 
sists in comparing ideas and their re- 
lations, it is frequently termed Reflection. 

16. — The laws of Association, 
Laws of Association, according to which the train 
of thought takes place, seem 
all to be resolvable into two. The first is this, 
that if two very vivid impressions have been experi- 
enced either simultaneously or in immediate suc- 
cession, then whenever either of these impressions, 
or the idea of it, recurs, it tends to excite the idea 
of the other. We take advantage of this law of 
association, when we tie a knot on our pocket 
handkerchief, whilst thinking steadily of something 
which we wish it to remind us of. When we again 
see the knot, it recalls the idea which we had in our 
mind at the time when we tied it. 
Recollection. When an idea is thus rendered afresh 
the subject of Consciousness, we are 
said to recollect it. The second law of Associa- 
tion is this, that the tendency of one idea to recall 
another, is increased by their being repeatedly 
viewed together, or in immediate succession. It 



METAPHYSICS. 13 

is by repetition that a boy gets the alphabet by 
heart. The sounds gradually become so associat- 
ed in his mind in their successive order, that the 
first, when uttered, suggests the second, that the 
third, and so on. That his power of recollection in 
this case depends upon this alone, he may convince 
himself by attempting to repeat the letters of the 
alphabet rapidly backwards, — an attempt in which 
he will be sure to fail. 

Of an object which we are in the habit of seeing 
daily, the idea is always becoming linked in new 
associations, so that an object which at first sug- 
gested nothing but painful ideas, such as the death 
of a lost friend to whom it belonged, gradually 
comes to be linked with ideas not simply painful. 
We say that we ctf get used to" the sight of it. 
But if we see such an object for the first time since 
our loss, after however long a period, then, as it 
has been associated with nothing new in the inter- 
val, it will be sure to affect us more by recalling no- 
thing but the unmitigated consciousness of our loss. 

17. — If we employ the word Idea to signify what 
is left by a sensation, we must say that a man has 
no idea of that which has never been presented to 
his senses. Thus a blind man can have no idea of 
colour. In the same way a man who has never 
met with a lion, has no idea of a lion ; but, on be- 
ing told that a lion is a kind of very large cat, with 
a mane of shaggy hair on its shoulders, he may put 

B 



14 ELEMENTS OP 

together the ideas which he already possesses of a 
cat, and of great bulk, and of a shaggy mane, and 
thus attain to what is called the Con- 
Conception. ception of a lion. The word concep- 
tion means the " taking together" of 
several ideas, to make up another. By a convenient 
extension of its meaning, the same term may be 
employed to designate the taking together certain 
residuary portions of a complex idea. Thus, a tu- 
berose has a very powerful odour ; but we can easi- 
ly form a conception of a tuberose destitute of 
odour. The blind man, on the other hand, can 
form no conception of colour, because the ideas 
with which his mind is furnished cannot, by any 
process of combination or separa- 
Imagination. tion, give colour as a result. When 
the formation of new ideas, which 
we have just described by the term Conception, is 
employed by the poet for the purpose of presenting 
to the reader novel images of striking beauty or 
grandeur, the term Imagination is employed to de- 
signate the mental process in question. 
Fancy. When the conceptions differ not merely 
in degree, but in kind, from the ideas due 
to human experience, the process takes the name of 
Fancy. The conception of a hero endowed with the 
strength of an elephant, and the speed of a deer, is 
imaginative : — that of a centaur, with the head of 
a man, and the body of a horse, is fanciful. 



METAPHYSICS. 15 

18. — Although whatever can be conceived can have 
a name assigned to it, yet as things 

General Terms, conceivable are innumerable, and 
we cannot afford to have innume- 
rable names, we must make one name serve for 
many individuals. We do this by giving one name to 
a number of similar things in respect of their similar- 
ity. Thus we call a great number of individuals by 
the term " man" in respect of their similarity. That 
in respect of which they resemble, be it what it may, 
may be denoted by such a term as Humanity, or 
man's nature, just as an unknown quantity in Al- 
gebra is denoted by a letter. We are not to sup- 
pose that this Humanity is something that resides 
in each man ; much less that it is something eternal, 
and residing for a time in transient beings. When 
we say that " the nature of a jar is not in cloth," 
the jar and the cloth are the only things thought of ; 
and we are really saying no more than this, that 
" cloth is not a jar." If we say that " the absence 
of the nature of a jar is the cause why cloth is not 
a jar," then the statement forms no addition to 
the knowledge conveyed in the equivalent state- 
ment, that " cloth is not a jar, because it is some- 
thing different." 

19. — Such a name as "Man," which is capable 
of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each 
of an indefinite number of things, is called a Com- 
mon, or General name. Generalization, or the act 



16 ELEMENTS OF 

of comprehending under a com- 
Generalization. mon name several objects which the • 
name serves to denote, and which 
resemble each other in some particular which the 
name is said to con-note, is not merely useful in eco- 
nomizing language. It is by means of general names 
that we are enabled to form general propositions, 
without which there could be no reasoning. What 
we can affirm with truth of an individual, may possi- 
bly be true of no other individual : — but what we can 
affirm with truth of all who are denoted by a common 
name, may be affirmed with truth of each individual 
denoted by the name : — and this 
Classification, is the fundamental axiom of Logic, 
the science of reasoning. The ob- 
jects denoted by a common name are said to con- 
stitute a class, and the arrangement of groupes 
of objects under such names is called Classifica- 
tion. 

20. — Having classified sugar, ho- 
Abstraction. ney, &c. as being things sweet to the 
taste, when we turn our attention 
to that in which all the members of the class 
resemble each other, the mind is said to perform 
the operation of Abstraction, which signifies " tak- 
ing away" that in which the similarity consists, 
and denoting it by a separate term. The term 
denoting the supposed object of consideration in 
such a case— for example " sweetness" — is called 



METAPHYSICS. 1/ 

an abstract term. Opposed to 
Concrete Terms, abstract is the term Concrete, by , 

which is meant a word denoting 
that which furnishes the source of an abstract term. 
Although every thing conceivable is nameable, it 
does not follow that every thing nameable is con- 
ceivable. A triangle with four sides, is nameable 
without being conceivable ; and the name, like an 
abstract term, may be employed without leading 
us into error, so long as we do not suppose that it 
represents a possible reality. Many valuable results 
in Algebra are arrived at by means of logical opera- 
tions on symbols representing what are avowedly 
designated Impossible Quantities. The Algebraist 
is not led by this to imagine that his Impossible 
Quantities are existing realities ; but he has as good 
reason to do so, as we have to conclude that an ab- 
stract term represents an existing reality, because 
we arrive at truths, by employing it as a symbol. 
The use of the term ec sweetness" need lead us into 
no error, so long as we do not forget that the sen- 
tence " Sugar is agreeable to the taste, from its 
sweetness/' means nothing different from this, that 
" Sugar is sweet, and therefore it is agreeable to the 
taste." 

21. — Doubt is the association of two con- 
Doubt. flicting notions with one object, as when, 
in the case of an object seen at some dis- 
tance, the notion arises that it is a man, and at the 



18 ELEMENTS OF 

same time the notion that it is a post. Doubt con- 
tinues until the one notion excludes the other. 

22. — Belief is the absence of doubt. 
Belief. A proposition which we believe we call 
true. By a true proposition we mean 
Truth, that which speaks of a thing as it real- 
ly is. When we believe a proposition 
Perception, which is not true, we are in error. Per- 
ception is the belief that a given sen- 
sation has an external cause, which we recognize 
under the denomination of the object perceived. 
Reasoning is the inferring that something is true, 
because w T e believe that something else is true. As 
every proposition which we believe 
First Truths, to be true must be either self-evi- 
dent or else dependent on some other 
truth, some truths must necessarily be self-evident, 
otherwise there would be no end to the chain of 
reasoning, and nothing could be established by the 
process. These self-evident propositions, or First 
Truths, we must know and believe in a superla- 
tive degree, for the very reason that we know 
and believe all other truths through them. For 
example, we require no proof of the assertion that 
c *it is impossible for the same thing at once both to 
be and not to be." The person who either does 
not perceive the truth of this, or who imagines 
that its truth could be rendered clearer by any 
process of demonstration, is held to be deficient 



METAPHYSICS. 19 

in common sense. The acceptance of a self-evident 
truth or axiom, is called an act of common sense, 
or of Reason. Reason, — the acceptance 
Reason. of what is self-evident— is not to be con- 
founded with reasoning — the making of 
an inference. We believe many things to be true on 
the testimony of other men. The credibility of 
Testimony is of great moment in 
Testimony. History, in treating of which, the 
question of the trustworthiness of 
our authorities requires to be carefully considered. 
Man is naturally disposed to rely upon the vera- 
city of those who tell him any thing. The child 
does so until he has been once deceived. The 
chief cautions in regard to the acceptance or rejec- 
tion of the testimony of any person are involved in 
the three questions, " Had he sufficient opportuni- 
ties of observing the facts to which he testifies V 7 
"'•Was he competent to judge of the facts which 
he had these opportunities of observing }" — and 
" Is he under no temptation to give a false report V 
23. — That state of mind which 
Emotion. excites a desire for action, is called 
Emotion. One state of mind is of 
such a kind, that we do not care whether its 
duration be long or short. This state we call one 
of Indifference. Another is of such a kind, that 
we would put an end to it instantly, if we 
could. This state we call Pain. Another is of 
such a kind, that we would make some effort to 



20 ELEMENTS OF 

prolong it. This state we call En- 
Good and Evil, joyment. The cause of pain we 
term Evil ; that of its opposite we 
term Good. The intentional producing of evil as 
pure evil, is always hated; and that of good, as 
pure good, always loved. Love and Hatred^ or De- 
sire and Aversion, mark out the two great divisions 
of the emotional states of mind which are also call- 
ed the Affections. An Affection of great intensity 
is termed a Passion. The cause of the 
Affections, conviction that the one kind of ac- 
tion is Wrong, or deserving of disap- 
proval ; and the other Right, or deserving of appro- 
val, is termed Conscience. The ques- 
Conscience. tion of what actions tend to produce 
good or evil, and are therefore right or 
wrong, belongs to the science of Ethics. 

24.— The cause of action, or that 
Volition, which immediately precedes it, is call- 
ed Volition, or Willing. The will is 
determined by Emotions. We naturally w T ish to 
avoid a pain which is utterly unconnected with any 
good, and to possess a good which entails no pain. 
Some men, eager to seize upon any pleasure placed 
within their reach, disregard the danger that a far 
more serious amount of pain may be entailed by the 
action which they resolve upon. To enable a man 
accurately to weigh the consequences of his actions 
is the business of that division of Ethics which 
when applied to practice, is called moral Educa- 



METAPHYSICS. 21 

tion. His moral education is not complete however^ 
nor is he entitled to the name of a virtuous 
Virtue, man, until the feeling of disapproval is so 
indissolubly associated in his mind with 
the notion of what is wrong, that he shrinks back 
from what is wrong instinctively, and without con- 
descending to calculate the chances of advantage. 
He who acts always merely on a calculation of the 
co nsequences, even should he always act rightly, 
is only prudent. The natural consequences of an 
action which, to the ethical enquirer, furnish the 
criterion of its fitness, can furnish no proper sub- 
stitute for the steady motives of action originating 
in those virtuous habits, which it is the most im- 
portant business of education to cultivate. 

25. — Actions may produce good or 
Actions, evil to others besides the agent. The 
prevention of those actions which are 
designed or calculated to produce evil to 
Law. others, is the object of that department of 
Ethics which, when applied to practice^ 
is termed Law or Jurisprudence. The encourage- 
ment of actions calculated to produce good to 
others, is partly provided for by that de- 
Politics. partment of practical Ethics, which is 
termed Politics, or the general manage- 
ment of a state ; and still more by Re- 
Religion. ligion, which signifies the viewing of 
ourselves and all things as related to 
God, and accountable to Him. 



22 ELEMENTS OF 

26. — Attributes, as has been already 
Attributes, stated, are either Relative or Non- 
relative. Attributes which are not re- 
lative, are called Qualities. Such are Colour, 
Taste, Smell, &c, which we speak of as belonging 
to an orange or a melon, without reference to 
each other, or to any other object. The qualities 
of external objects are their powers of 
Relation, causing sensation. Relation is the term 
for the mode in which we view two 
things which, in consideration of some fact in 
which they are both concerned, receive names, 
each of which suggests the other. That in con- 
sideration of which the names are given is called 
the ground of the relation. Thus, in consider- 
ation of the fact that William has lent money 
to Thomas, Thomas is called William's debtor, 
and William is called Thomas's creditor. Debt- 
or and Creditor are relative names. Each of the 
names is said to be the Correlative of the other. 
Simple relations are those which are founded on a 
notion which is incapable of being resolved into any 
thing simpler. Such are the relations founded on 
likeness, unlikeness, identity, difference, simulta- 
neousness, sequence, quantity, position, change. 
Every body knows what these mean, and nobody 
can tell; just as every body who can see, knows 
what white means, but nobody can convey to a 
blind man a notion of what it means. 



METAPHYSICS. 23 

The relation of difference gives rise to 
Number, the conception of Number ; for, where 
there is difference, there is more than 
one. Quantities, some multiple of the lesser of which 
may equal some multiple of the greater, are called 
commensurable. Where this is not the case, they 
are called incommensurable. When the excess of 
a quality in any object is not directly 
Intensity, susceptible of numerical representa- 
tion, the difference is called one of 
Intensity. Thus the blue colour of the sky is more 
intense at one time than at another, but cannot be 
said to be at one time twice or thrice what it was 
at another time. 

28. — Two relations are said to resemble each 
other when a resemblance exists between the facts 
which severally constituted the ground of the rela- 
tions. The resemblance of two rela- 
Analogy, tions is called Analogy. If the resem- 
blance between the ground of the 
two relations be slight, the analogy is said to be 
slight. Analogy, in the case of quan- 
Proportion. tity, where the ground of the rela- 
tion is not merely similar, but identi- 
cal, is termed Proportion. — In proportion the ana- 
logy is complete. Complex relations are innume- 
rable, for there are as many conceivable relations, 
as there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two 
things can be jointly concerned. We have for ex- 



24 ELEMENTS OF 

ample, the relation of Paternity, on which are 
founded ( though not etymologically so) the cor- 
relative names of Father and Son : — and so again 
we have the correlative names, Ruler and Subject, 
Master and Servant, and so on. 

When we believe that two objects do 
Motion, not occupy the same relative position 
which they occupied before, we infer that 
one or other of them has changed its place and 
moved, or that we ourselves have moved. We can 
tell which has moved, only by referring their present 
positions to some other point, the previous position 
of which, relatively to each, we remember, and 
which we assume to have remained at rest. Our 
conception of Motion is always relative, its correla- 
tive being Rest. It is obvious that the sun and the 
earth do not maintain the same relative position. 
Motion is necessarily inferred ; and whilst one man 
infers that the earth has moved, another feels cer- 
tain that the sun has moved. So a man in a boat 
does not doubt that he is receding from the shore ; 
whilst the child in his arms doubts as little that the 
shore is receding from him. 

29. — A most important pair of 
Cause and Effect, correlative terms is Cause and 
Effect. The ground of the re- 
lation in this case is supplied by our instinctive 
conviction that whatever existing thing did not 
at one time exist, must have owed its beginning to 



METAPHYSICS, 25 

some thing previously existing. That 
Power. previously existing, to which any thing 
owed its beginning, we term its Cause. 
The correlative of a cause we call its Effect. The 
nature of a cause, or that in virtue of which it 
produces an effect, is expressed by the term Power. 
Power, when motion is the effect, is called Force. 

A cause must either be self-existent, or it must 
owe its existence to some other cause; and that again, 
if not self- existent, to some other, and so on, with- 
out end. The mind, naturally revolting against the 
incomprehensible idea of an infinite succession of 
causes, no one of which could come into existence 
without one previous to it, rests with assurance on the 
conviction that there is one Self-existing First Cause, 
which we recognize by the name of God. All else that 
we call a cause, is so, solely because God so wills it. 
The only way in which we can determine that any 
thing is a cause, is by observing that its presence is 
always attended by the same phenomenon, which we 
therefore designate as its effect. The rules for ob- 
serving correctly, constitute the art of Discovery^ 
an art to which the greatest philosophers have made 
successive contributions, and the improvement of 
which is likely to be continually progressive as 
discoveries themselves accumulate. We do not 
derive our first notion of causation from experience, 
for we are at first disposed to think that every two 
phenomena which occur in immediate succession are 



26 ELEMENTS OF 

related in the way of cause and effect. It requires 
experience to correct this notion, and to teach us in 
what cases phenomena are related in the way of cause 
and effect, and in what cases they are merely in the 
relation of accidental contiguity. 

When we trace back a series of causes till we 
can trace it no further, we are not entitled to say 
that we have reached the link in the chain next to 
that which is in the hand of God — but at the same 
time, we have no right to insist that we have not. 
For example, when we see a stone, on its being left- 
unsupported, begin to fall to the ground, we are 
justified in saying that the motion had a cause, for 
it had a beginning ; and we may call this cause, if 
we choose, the attraction of the earth. But the 
word " attraction" is merely a term which stands 
for the unknown cause of the phenomenon of fall- 
ing bodies ; and no addition will be made to our 
knowledge by interposing another imaginary cause, 
such as an attractive ether, to account for the exis- 
tence of the attraction. The fact that bodies at- 
tract each other may be the immediate result of the 
will of God, which could of course make each body 
a cause of attraction to all others ; or it may be the 
result of a long chain of causes hidden from our view. 

The limit of our actual knowledge in regard to 

any phenomenonis 

The limit of Knowledge, marked by the employ- 
ment of a word which 



METAPHYSICS, 



27 



signifies the unknown cause of the phenomenon. 
Many philosophers, deluded by the notion that the 
Symbol which they employed for "the unknown 
cause of something/' stood for something that they 
knew, have gone on supplying imaginary links to 
the chain of causes in the shape of imaginary pow- 
ers of nature, and lengthening it out till they lost 
sight of the end of it, have persuaded themselves 
that the chain can support itself. Thus relying 
upon what are called Second Causes, they deny 
the necessity of a First Cause, being about as 
wise as the ancient Arabs, who fancied that the 
earth was supported by an ahgel, who stood upon a 
rock of ruby, sustained by a great bull on the back 
of an enormous fish floating on water, which was 
supported by darkness into which the eye or mind of 
man could not penetrate so as to discover any sup- 
port for the fantastically accumulated load. 

30. — Our know- 
Science, Art, and Philosophy, ledge of the uniform 

relations of things 
constitutes Science. The application of such know- 
ledge to the production of particular results con- 
stitutes Art. Thus the art of mental education con- 
sists in turning our knowledge of the mind into 
rules for producing the highest development of the 
mind. The discoveries of science are recorded in 
the indicative mood ; the rules of art are enuncia- 
ted in the imperative. The investigation of the 



28 ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS. 

ultimate grounds of all knowledge, having in all ages 
attracted the attention of the lovers of wisdom, is 
called (from the Greek word signifying " the love 
of wisdom ") Philosophy. 



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